Executive summary
Low-cost drones have begun reshaping conflict and creating risks that extend far beyond the battlefield. Their affordability permits state and non-state actors to deploy them at scale, overwhelm more expensive air defense systems and target energy, transport and communications infrastructure, resulting in human and financial losses. Rapid innovation, including first-person-view and fiber-optic drone systems, is shortening the time available for air defense systems to adapt. For businesses, the threat is not limited to a successful strike: sightings, reconnaissance and airspace incursions can halt flights, suspend shipping, delay supply chains and raise security and insurance costs. Recent incidents across the Middle East, Ukraine and Europe display a widening imbalance between the low cost of generating disruption and the high cost of preventing it. Organizations should therefore treat drone activity as an operational resilience issue.
The proliferation of inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has profoundly transformed the modern security landscape, converting drones from niche military assets into one of the defining technologies of modern conflict. Initially used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, low-cost drones are now routinely employed to conduct long-range strikes, overwhelm sophisticated air defense systems and disrupt critical infrastructure at a fraction of the cost of conventional weaponry.[1]
Recent increase in military drone usage during the Iran conflict and in Ukraine have demonstrated how commercially available and low-cost military drones can achieve disproportionate operational and strategic effects. Their widespread availability, combined with rapid technological innovation, has enabled both state and non-state actors to contest against far more expensive defensive capabilities, forcing governments to reconsider procurement priorities while accelerating investment in autonomous systems.[2]
These implications extend well beyond the battlefield. Drone activity targeting energy infrastructure, commercial shipping, airports and other critical assets has highlighted the growing vulnerability of businesses operating within complex or unique security environments. Beyond kinetic attacks, sightings around strategic infrastructure can disrupt operations, delay transport, increase security costs and create significant uncertainty for organizations.
This report seeks to examine how low-cost drones are reshaping the modern threat landscape through three key themes: the increasing use of inexpensive drones in conventional conflict, the rapid evolution of drone technology, and the emergence of drone-related hybrid threats affecting critical infrastructure across Europe. These developments demonstrate why organizations should monitor drone activity as an increasingly persistent operational risk rather than a purely military concern.
Cheap drones, expensive defense
The widespread use of inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) throughout the 2026 Iran conflict by the IRGC and it’s proxies, demonstrated how low-cost systems have become a central feature of modern warfare. Intelligence Fusion recorded 572 drone-related incidents across the Middle East between February and July 2026, illustrating the scale at which drones are now employed by both state and non-state actors. Rather than acting solely as supporting reconnaissance assets, drones were used alongside ballistic missiles to overwhelm air defense systems, target military infrastructure and place sustained pressure on defensive resources.
The IRGC has also increasingly combined one-way attack drones with ballistic missile salvos, employing large waves of inexpensive systems to overwhelm layered air-defense networks and exhaust expensive interceptor inventories. This approach underlines the economic advantage of low-cost drones, forcing defenders to expend significantly more expensive defensive munitions against comparatively inexpensive aerial threats.
The cost imbalance. A Shahed-series drone costs roughly US$35,000; a single Patriot PAC-3 interceptor costs roughly US$4 million, a cost ratio of around 114:1 in favor of the attacker.
This shift reflects a broader change in the economics of conflict. Cost-effectiveness has become a defining feature of modern drone warfare. According to CSIS, relatively inexpensive attack drones can force defenders to expend interceptors that cost many times more. Iran’s Shahed-series drones exemplify this approach. Costing approximately US$35,000 per unit, they are designed for mass production using a combination of domestically manufactured or reverse-engineered parts and commercially available components sourced through international supply chains, including Western-manufactured electronics and aerospace components procured through China and other intermediary markets. By comparison, a single Patriot PAC-3 interceptor costs approximately US$4 million, creating a cost ratio of around 114:1 in favor of the attacker. During sustained attacks, this imbalance places significant pressure on interceptor stockpiles, procurement budgets and long-term defensive readiness. Rather than relying on technological superiority, their effectiveness lies in overwhelming defensive systems through quantity and persistence while steadily increasing the financial and logistical burden on the defender.[3][4]
Beyond their favorable cost exchange ratio, the growing accessibility of drone technology is accelerating its proliferation. Commercially available components, simplified manufacturing processes and widely available navigation and communications technologies have lowered the barriers to entry for both state and non-state actors. As a result, capabilities once largely confined to advanced militaries are becoming increasingly attainable, expanding the range of actors capable of threatening critical infrastructure and commercial assets.
During the conflict, Intelligence Fusion recorded multiple drone strikes targeting oil refineries, oil fields and oil terminals across the Gulf, highlighting the exposure of critical commercial infrastructure to relatively inexpensive aerial threats.